source-library

IMMIGRATION (EUROPE)

Here’s a better doc for this issue specifically

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Brexit

Brexit

• Disproving claims that a majority of EU laws are not influenced by the UK: https://fullfact.org/europe/uk-law-what-proportion-influenced-eu/

• Disproving claims that the EU is mostly voting against the UK: https://fullfact.org/europe/eu-facts-behind-claims-uk-influence/

• Explaining why the EU has a lot of laws: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36473105

CLAIM: “We voted for a no-deal”

• https://www.businessinsider.com/liam-fox-promises-to-sign-40-free-trade-deals-the-second-after-brexit-2017-10?r=US&IR=T “I hear people saying ‘oh we won’t have any [free trade agreements] before we leave’. Well believe me we’ll have up to 40 ready for one second after midnight in March 2019” - Liam Fox

• https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-6793255/MICHAEL-GOVE-backing-Prime-Ministers-deal-EU-ensure-Brexit-happens.html “Some may say that ditching this deal will allow us to leave without any compromises. But we didn’t vote to leave without a deal. That wasn’t the message of the campaign I helped lead.” - Gove

• https://www.standard.co.uk/news/politics/brexit-latest-matt-hancock-refuses-to-rule-out-deaths-from-medicine-shortages-in-uk-crashes-out-of-a3990706.html “We cannot guarantee people will not die as a result of a no-deal brexit” - Hancock

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Crime

Crime

Europe Overall

Luca Nunziata 15: Journal of Population Economics

• The 2000s increase in immigration flow into Western European countries is used to assess whether immigration affects crime victimization and the perception of criminality among European natives.

• Using data from the European Social Survey, the Labour Force Survey and other sources, a set of fixed effects and instrumental variable estimations are provided that deal with the endogenous sorting of immigration by region and with the sampling error in survey-based measures of regional immigration shares, whose implications in terms of attenuation bias are investigated by means of Monte Carlo simulations.

• Empirical findings show that an increase in immigration does not affect crime victimization, but is associated with an increase in the fear of crime. This is also positively correlated with native populations’ negative perceptions of immigrants.

• Reveals a misconception that native Europeans hold of the link between crime and immigrants, which isn’t supported.

Sweden

• Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency 16

  • (Annotations and a summary of the original swedish report are here) Christopher Fariss & Kristine Eck: University of Michigan

  • According to the new 2016 Swedish police code, code 291 refers to crimes involving refugees. Police officers can insert the code whenever an asylum seeker is involved in a crime. 1% of police reports had this code.

  • Meanwhile, Sweden hosted 180,000 asylum seekers during this period, out of a population of 10 million. This means that asylum seekers were 1.8% of the population

  • The data show that 55% (1799) of the 3,287 police reports (the 1% that involved refugees) filed took place at asylum-seeker accommodation facilities, while 159 were committed by outsiders, and so the majority of the incidents contained in these reports took place within asylum centers.

  • Violent crimes were greatly overrepresented among the reports filed within asylum centers, at 73%, while only 30% of reports outside of asylum centers involved violent crime

  • Reports manually reviewed by swedish police investigators to filter out known errors, since reports are filed by police officers on the spot

  • Quote from the swedish source which you can translate:

    • “På en övergripande nivå kan det därför konstateras att det skett många incidenter på asylboenden, men sannolikt inte fler än i en motsvarande population i svenska samhället. Under 2015 kom en grupp som motsvarade 2% av Sveriges befolkning, dvs en väsentlig populationsökning som ledde till en ansenlig belastning på samhällets resurser. Samtidigt var enbart 1% av alla polisrelaterade händelser relaterade till flyktingkrisen, dvs något mindre än vad som skulle kunna antas. Sammanlagt kom över 160 000 asylsökande och för att sätta dessa siffror i ett mer förståeligt sammanhang så kan man tänka att om alla asylsökande från 2015 bildade en stad hade den staden varit Sveriges fjärde största, efter Stockholm, Göteborg och Malmö.”

• Hällsten et al. 13: The British Journal of Criminology - Credits to Rose Wrist

  • Examining the gap in registered crime between the children of immigrants and the children of native Swedes in Stockholm
  • For males, they are able to explain between half and three-quarters of the gap in crime by reference to only 2 socioeconomic factors, parental socio-economic resources, and neighborhood segregation
  • For females, they can explain even more, sometimes the entire gap using only these 2 factors
  • In addition, they tentatively examine the role of co-nationality or culture by comparing the crime rates of randomly chosen pairs of individuals originating from the same country. They find only a small correlation in the crime of individuals who share the same origin, indicating that culture is unlikely to be a strong cause of crime among immigrants

Netherlands

• W. Achbari. A.S. Leerkes 16-17: Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en Documentatiecentrum

  • Dutch longitudinal study of asylum seekers and their impact on crime in neighborhoods in 2005, 2010 and 2015 (last year counts the height of the refugee crisis)
  • English summary at page 59
  • Finds that when you account for socio-economic position, gender and age, asylum seekers, and their children, commit LESS crime in the Netherlands per capita in all three years. It also shows that when you make it easier for those asylum seekers to get residence permits, they actually commit LESS crime than when you make it harder. This is also present in the data shown, which shows that of the countries shown, migrants from countries which have easier residence permits (Syria and Eritrea) commit less crime than those of safer countries.
  • Results mirror what we see in the studies from Italy: Legal immigrants commit less crime than illegal ones, because they have a shot at citizenship, so they don’t turn to crime.
• Ethnicity and Crime in the Netherlands: James D. Unnever 18
  • META-ANALYSIS on immigrant crime in the Netherlands
  • Some studies show that ethnic minorities, including Moroccans and Turks, are less likely to commit crimes than the native Dutch. Other research indicates that ethnic minorities are more likely to commit crimes than the native Dutch. The research is also unclear as to whether there are gender differences.
    • Studies which show less crime by minorities are cross-sectional and longitudinal self-report studies, and there is evidence minorities self-report less. However, research which shows minorities commit more crime is police data, and police data is confounded by likely police discrimination, which varies between even different ethnic minorities.
  • Some studies suggest that native Dutch females are more likely than ethnic minority females to commit crimes,while other research indicates that immigrant females are more likely than the native Dutch females to engage in crimes.
  • Additionally, there are studies that indicate similarly situated individuals, regardless of whether they belong to an ethnic group or are native Dutch, have the same likelihood of committing crimes. In other words, the reason why immigrants have a greater probability of being arrested is because they are disproportionately exposed to crime-related factors such as being of a lower socioeconomic status and being younger and more often male than the average native Dutch person.
• Martine Blom & Roel Jennissen 13: Research and Documentation Centre (WODC)
  • The authors studied the degree to which various ethnic groups are represented in various types of officially registered criminal offenses and the degree to which the chance of being a suspect in specific types of crimes can be explained by demographic and socio-economic background characteristics of the person in question.
  • The results show that there are clear differences among ethnic groups with respect to the relative share of various types of criminal offenses. Only a small part of the differences relate to ethnic origin; demographic and socio-economic background characteristics play a more important role.
  • A large part of the explanation might be found in personal factors, coincidental circumstances or background characteristics not included in the model.

Germany

• Thomas Feltes, Katrin List, and Maximilian Bertamini 18: Ruhr-University Bochum
  • Assesses the topic of correlations between increasing refugee numbers and crime statistics based on data collected during the migration of more than one million refugees to Germany in 2015 and 2016.
  • The first part is about the difficulties of comparing crime rates of nationals (in this case Germans) to those of non-nationals for various reasons, including registration and especially due to certain prevailing social factors and circumstances, such as gender and age.
  • Finds that while crime is falling, citizens perceive crime to be rising, and analyses said paradox.
  • Analyses crimes committed against non-nationals.
  • Shows that the surplus of crime is mainly a result of the composition of the migrants (young, single males) and that most of the offenses committed are nonviolent offenses
  • Estimates that most of the violent offenses have been committed between migrants and in the context of refugee housing or shelters.
  • Many crimes related to being an asylum seeker (such as being unregistered) that can’t be committed by natives drive up the numbers artificially
  • The authors write:
    • “But while more (primary male and young) refugees “produce”—for obvious statistical reasons—more offenders and more crime, the victimization of migrants and refugees as a result of their “journey”is often neglected by the public, politicians, and the media. We have also shown that the surplus of crime is mainly a result of the composition of the migrants (young, single males) and that most of the offenses committed are nonviolent offenses.”
    • “If one would attribute the increase in crime that was observed in 2015 entirely to the refugees that entered Germany in this year, this would lead to a rate of suspects per 100.00 (Tatverd chtigenbelastungszahl, TVBZ) of 5800 for this group of refugees. This rate for Germans was 2124. Hence, the rate for refugees would be considerably higher than the rate for the Germans. But if we take a closer look at the rate of Germans aged between 16 and 30 (which is the age group most closely to that of refugees), one comes to another conclusion. Here, the rate for Germans ranges between 4200 and 5800, so absolutely in the range that is calculated (though inadequately) when observing refugees only. If we apply these numbers to those offenses that seem to matter most to the public (such as burglaries and sexual assaults), then the increase of non-German suspects (and especially of refugees) is considerably lower than one would initially have expected.”
  • Interpretation: This means that most of the actual consequences of the crimes have fallen on other asylum seekers, meaning the crime burden on the native population is smaller than for a native citizen per capita. This is in addition to their suspect numbers not being higher.
• Markus Ghersitz & Martin Ungerer 17: IZA Institute of economics
  • MASSIVE STUDY on the effects of immigration on the labor market for natives and former immigrants, unemployment, crime, which factors played a role, as well as the effects of immigration on attitudes and voting patterns. We will deal with the crime aspects here, click here for the economic ones, and here for the attitudes
  • Within states, migrants were allocated to counties based on reasons unrelated to local labor market conditions or crime levels.
  • Housing vacancies are not significant determinants of refugee allocations, although it remains conceivable that the availability of estates that can house a large amount of refugees all in one place, e.g. abandoned barracks, is a predictor.
  • Suggests that - with the obvious exception of violations to right-of-residence and asylum laws - there is no association between the number of refugees and the number of street crimes in Germany.
  • However, a statistically significant relationship between bigger reception centers and drug crimes and fare-dodging is found, as well as the number of non-German suspects in relation to these crimes. This might partly be driven by higher alertness of police in these counties. The idea that crime rates in reception centers are higher is supported by other studies.
    • Solution: This indicates that spreading out refugees across the country is better than concentrating them. This can be done by filling housing vacancies. Also, legalization of drugs and treatment of addicts would destroy that black market.
• Huang, Yue; Kvasnicka, Michael 19: Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
  • VERY LARGE STUDY on victimization rates of natives by refugees
  • Results do not support the view that Germans were victimized in greater numbers by refugees as measured by their rate of victimization in crimes with refugee suspects.
  • Finds evidence that the overall victimization rate (that is, when crime by natives and crimes against refugees are included) has a hump-shape relationship with the scale of refugee immigration when using non-linear regression, however finds no statistically significant difference between 2014 and 2015 with two types of linear regression
  • Finds that decentralized accommodation of refugees, at given levels of refugee immigration to a county, tends to reduce the overall crime rate in a county (while refugee sex ratios exert no effect).
  • Finds no evidence that the victimization rate of native germans is increased with refugee arrival, regardless of scale, type of housing accommodation of refugees or gender composition. That is, crimes committed against Germans in which refugees are suspects do not increase the victimization rates of native germans.
    • “Our results do not support the view that Germans were victimized in greater numbers by refugees as measured by their rate of victimization in crimes with refugee suspects.”
  • These results hold true not only for total victimization of natives by refugees but also sub-groups of crimes like economic crimes, violent crimes and sexual crimes (rape and sexual assault).
  • Key findings corroborated in various robustness checks, including the measurement of victimization outcomes in 2016 (rather than 2015) and the use of IV regressions that exploit for identification information on the 2014 pre-crisis location of refugee reception centers and their aerial distance to population-weighted centroids of counties located within the same federal state.
  • Conclusions drawn from the study: since there is no link in the victimization rate of germans and refugee arrival regardless of housing accommodation, and decentralized housing accomodation for refugees reduces crime, the view that segregated communities and refugee centers increase crime by refugees against other refugees increased, while policies to further integrate the refugee population reduce the overall crime rate
  • Quote: “Above all, however, studies in both bodies of literature suffer from a basic but fundamental shortcoming which has received little, if any, attention to date. They standardly make use of but crude crime or victimization rates in their analyses, that is crimes and victims per capita, or variants thereof, but never of actual rates of victimization of natives by refugees or foreigners. This drawback weighs heavily, for crude crime and victimization rates are only a very imperfect measure of the latter, including in their count also crimes confined to foreigners (crimes by and against foreigners), crimes confined to natives (crimes by and against natives), and crimes in which foreigners are victimized by natives (crimes by natives against foreigners), which includes even hate or anti-foreigner crimes. As each of these crimes may vary in its prevalence systematically with the level of immigration, crude crime and victimization rates are rather inappropriate for investigating whether natives are harmed by immigration. In fact, as we will show, their use can lead to seriously biased inference.”
  • Methodology:
    • “The first data set comprises detailed, high-quality statistics on the regional distribution of refugees, their gender composition, age structure, and type of accommodation (decentralized or centralized, i.e. in group quarters), prior to and after the mass inflow of refugees in the latter part of 2015. This data set has been constructed from special data extracts drawn from the Statistic on Asylum Seekers’ Benefits (SASB) (“Asylbewerberleistungsstatistik”), an administrative public registry with full coverage of all refugees who seek asylum and receive such benefits in Germany”
    • Second data set: “Our special data extracts from the SASB allow us to study also compositional features of regional refugee populations, such as their gender composition and accommodation structure.”
• Rita Maghularia, Silke Uebelmesser 19: Technical University Dresden
  • The paper analyses the empirical relationship between immigrants and crime using panel data for 391 German administrative districts between 2003 and 2016 (which is within the syrian refugee crisis of 2015).
  • Shows no positive association between the immigrant rate and the crime rate.
  • Methodology:
    • “We assess the robustness of this result by considering the heterogeneity of immigrant groups with respect to gender, age, country of origin and – if applicable – refugee status, and study naturalized immigrants. We also take into account possible spillover effects of immigrants on criminal activities by Germans, omitted variables and spatial correlation. Furthermore, taking advantage of the panel-structure of the data set we employ an instrumental variable approach that deals with the possibly endogenous allocation of immigrants and allows for causal interpretation of the estimates.”
• Klaus Boers 17: European Journal of Criminology
  • According to a 2017 study in the European Journal of Criminology, the crime rate was higher among immigrant youths than native youths during the 1990s and 2000s but most of the difference could be explained by socioeconomic factors.
  • The different crime rates narrowed in the last ten years; the study speculates that “a new citizenship law finally granting German-born descendants of guest workers German citizenship, as well as increased integration efforts (particularly in schools) and a stronger disapproval of violence” may have contributed to this narrowing.

United Kingdom

• Brian Bell & Stephen Machin 11: Center for Economic Performance
  • Longitudinal study covering 40 years of immigration into the UK
  • Uses both official reported crime and self-reported victimization data
  • Strong and consistent evidence that enclaves have lower crime experiences than otherwise observably similar neighbourhoods that have a lower immigrant share of the population. This effect appears to be significant when we reach somewhere between 20-30% immigrant share and is observed whether we use recorded crime data or self-reported crime victimisation data. The effect is present for both natives and immigrants, though it appears somewhat larger for immigrants.
  • Finds that there is no link between immigrant population share and violent crimes like burglary, but that immigrants reduce antisocial behavior and non-violent crime.
• Georgios Papadopoulos 14: IZA Journal of Migration
  • Studies the individual-level relationship between immigration and property crime in England and Wales using crime self-reports from the Crime and Justice Survey.
  • Models that account for underreporting are used, since this is a major concern in crime self-reports.
  • The results indicate that the reported crime is substantially underreported, but if anything, immigrants are less likely to underreport than natives.
  • More importantly, controlling for underreporting and basic demographics, the estimates across all model specifications, although imprecise, indicate that immigration status and property crime are negatively associated.
  • Also finds that the estimated relationship between immigration status and property crime differs across regions and ethnic groups.
• Laura Jaitman & Stephen Machin 13: IZA Journal of Migration
  • Studies the link between crime and immigration based on evidence from England and Wales in the 2000s.
  • For studying immigration impacts, this period is of considerable interest as the composition of migration to the UK altered dramatically with the accession of Eastern European countries (the A8) to the European Union in 2004.
  • Finds no evidence of an average causal impact of immigration on crime, nor when A8 and Non-A8 immigration are considered separately.
  • Also studies London by itself as the immigration changes over time in the capital city were large. Again, no causal impact of immigration on crime from spatial econometric analysis was found. In addition, unique data on arrests of natives and immigrants in London also shows no immigrant differences in the likelihood of being arrested.
• Dainis Ignatans & Roger Matthews 17: European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice
  • Study explores the impact that the recent increase of immigration into the UK may have had on recorded crime levels.
  • First, compares the decrease in violent crime in cities with high levels of recent immigration with cities with relatively low immigration levels. Second, explores variations in recorded criminal involvement amongst different immigrant groups living in different areas. Third, examines the data on antisocial behaviour and disorder noting that there is a blurring of the distinction between anti-social behaviour and crime at certain points. Fourth, looks at the arrest data for Greater London in 2011.
  • Study uses said empirical evidence from England and Wales to suggest that, in contrast to the popular opinion that increased immigration is associated with an increase in crime, that not only are the recent waves of immigration not linked to rising crime, but also that findings lend qualified support to the contention that recent waves of immigration have contributed to the crime drop that has taken place in the UK and other countries over the last two decades.

Italy

• Franco Pittau & Stefano Trasatti 09: Agenzia Redattore Sociale e Dossier statistico immigrazione Caritas/Migrantes (Data is in Italian, use google translate)
  • According to 2007 data, the crime rate of legal immigrants was 1.2–1.4% whereas the crime rate was 0.8% for native Italians.
  • The overrepresentation is partly due to the large number of young legal immigrants, the crime rate is 1.9% for legal immigrants aged 18–44 whereas it is 1.5% for their Italian peers; 0.4% for legal immigrants aged 45–64 years whereas it is 0.7% for their Italian peers; and for those over 65 years old, the crime rates is the same among natives and foreigners.
  • In fact, if the age structure difference between natives and legal immigrants was accounted for, the number of young italian natives would increase, and the total italian native crime rate would increase to 1.02%.
  • 16.9% of crimes committed by legal immigrants are also linked to violations of immigration laws, which natives can’t commit. By also excluding those crimes, the crime rate of legal immigrants is largely the same as that of Italians with the same age structure, at 1.03%
  • The study makes it known that, were it able to account for the “unfavorable socioeconomic conditions” of immigrants, the balance would likely land on natives commiting more crime when that is taken into account.
  • With the subsequent decrease in crime between 2007-2016 of 65% among immigrants, while the decrease overall was only 25%, this would be an even better improvement for the picture of immigrant crime in Italy. Paolo Pinotti 20
  • Best of the studies by Pinotti, since it counts two types of undocumented immigrants, much like Mastrobuoni and Pinotti (2014).
  • Study on the effect of legalization on the crime rates of undocumented immigrants.
  • Uses two study groups; former prison inmates and applicants for work permits. In spite of obvious differences in the two groups, a more than reduction in crime rates was seen in both.
    • Experiment 1: “The crime rate of Romanians and Bulgarians is identical to that of the other group in the months prior to the EU enlargement, but it decreases markedly after the enlargement. In particular, close to 6 percent of pardoned inmates were re-arrested in both groups before the enlargement; this fraction drops to 2.3 percent for Romanians and Bulgarians after the enlargement, whereas there is no significant decline for the other group. Therefore, the acquisition of legal status cuts the probability of committing crimes by more than half in our sample of former prison inmates.”. Specifically, by 61.7%.
    • Experiment 2: “I find that in the year after Click Days, the crime rate decreases by half for immigrants who applied just before the permit cut-off date and had the application accepted, compared to immigrants who applied just after the cutoff and, therefore, had the application rejected. In addition, I uncover an interesting heterogeneity by type of contract. In particular, applicants sponsored by individuals and families for domestic work (e.g., caregivers) exhibit both a higher crime rate and a stronger response to legal status compared to applicants sponsored by firms.”
  • The study highlights the importance of access to the labor market as a vector for reducing crime, since it acts as an incentive to social behavior and a disincentive to criminal behavior.
  • The study also finds that when it comes to work applicants, those who initially exhibit higher crime rates also exhibit a stronger crime reduction response to legalization.
• Paolo Pinotti 17
  • 2017 study analyzing the 2007 “Click days” legalization of undocumented immigrants in Italy
  • Finds that when legalized, the crime rates of legalized immigrants on average fell by 0.6 percentage points, from a baseline of 1.1%. This means their crime rates fell by 55%.
• Paolo Pinotti et al. 13
  • According to a 2013 report, undocumented immigrants are responsible for the vast majority of crimes committed in Italy by immigrants
  • The share of undocumented immigrants varies between 60 and 70 percent for violent crimes, and it increases to 70–85 percent for property crime.
  • In 2009, the highest shares were in burglary (85%), car theft (78%), theft (76%), robbery (75%), assaulting public officers / resisting arrest (75%), handling stolen goods (73%).”
  • Finds that the 2007 “Click-day” reduced crime rates of all immigrants by 3.5% for every 10% increase in legalization (share of accepted applications) by region. This translates into 35% if all applications are accepted. A later study mentioned in this document shows that its direct effect on newly legalized immigrants is a 55% reduction.
  • Keep in mind, not every undocumented immigrant necessarily sends an application, and the ones who don’t recieve a permit due to quotas are encouraged to do more crime, hiding a possibly larger potential effect from full legalization. Finally, simply having given them legal status from the start would have encouraged faster integration into the workforce and lowered crime rates, which can be adopted as a future policy.
  • Prison population data may not give a reliable picture of immigrants’ involvement in criminal activity due to different bail and sentencing decisions for foreigners. Foreigners are, for instance, far more overrepresented in the prison population than their share of convictions relative to the native population, indicating that they may be guilty of far less of these crimes.
• Giovanni Mastrobuoni & Paolo Pinotti 14
  • Confirms that legalization of illegal immigrants in Italy would drastically reduce their crime rates
  • Focuses on Italy before and after the January 2007 European Union enlargement, finds that giving legal status to the previously illegal immigrants from the new EU member states led to a “50 percent reduction in recidivism”.
  • The authors find that “legal status… explains one-half to two-thirds of the observed differences in crime rates between legal and illegal immigrants”.
• Asher Colombo 13: European Journal of Criminology
  • According to an Italian study from 2013, the majority of foreign prisoners are held in connection with a drug offence.
  • One out of every nine offences ascribed to foreign prisoners concerns violation of ‘laws governing foreigners’, which are specific to foreigners and hence should not be counted
  • The 2013 study cites literature that points to discriminatory practices against foreigners by Italian law enforcement, judiciary and penal system.
  • Study indicates that with a decriminalization and legalization of drugs, a large black market can be destroyed, and a majority of prisoners can be released from prison and new ones prevented
• Donato Di Carlo, Julia Schulte-Cloos & Giulia Saudelli 18
  • Data for 2007-2016 (within the 2011 and 2015 migrant crises)
  • Finds that overall crime per 1,000 inhabitants has decreased by 25% on average between 2007 and 2016 across all Italian regions
  • The majority of the 20 Italian regions plus the 2 autonomous provinces display a lower crime rate than their individual regional average of the previous ten years.
  • The number of granted asylum permits in Italy follows the opposite pattern. Since the onset of the migration crisis in 2013, the share of people who have been granted asylum in the country has increased almost exponentially, from around 0.2 per 1000 people in 2007 to 1.6 per 1000 people in 2016
  • The share of convicted foreigners is at an unprecedented all-time low. The average regional crime rate among foreigners has decreased by around 65% between 2007 and 2016.
  • The decline has happened uniformly across all Italian regions
  • This happened during the 2011 libyan refugee crisis and the 2015 syrian refugee crisis
• Milo Bianchi, Paolo Buonanno and Paolo Pinotti 12 (Pretty old data - rather use new ones)
  • Examines immigrant crime across Italian provinces during the period of 1990-2003.
  • Uses official police data to document crime.
  • Examines the instrumental variables based on immigration towards countries other than Italy to identify the causal external effects of immigration.
  • Finds that only robbery, a very minor fraction of criminal offenses, is increased.
  • “The effect on overall crime is not significantly different from zero.”

France

• Yu Aoki & Yasuyuki Todo 09
  • French study on the crime rates of immigrants
  • Finds that once immigrants’ economic circumstances are controlled for, the effect of the share of immigrants becomes insignificant, suggesting that immigrants are not ‘inherently’ more likely to commit crimes than the rest of the population. In addition, results indicate that unemployed immigrants are more likely to commit crimes than unemployed nonimmigrants, because immigrants’ circumstances are more adverse. Hence, because unemployed immigrants tend to have less wealth to support them, lower education, and generally less accumulated capital or opportunities. Thus, policies that improve the economic circumstances of immigrants may go a long way to lowering crime rates.
  • Study does not factor in either age or gender, which may play a role.

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Jobs and Wages

Jobs and Wages

• Phillip Connor, Jeffrey S. Passel 19: Pew Research Center
  • Data showing the EU has way less illegal immigrants than the US, which alongside the study of the JRC and the effect of illegal immigrants that is observed in the US can indicate that medium to long term illegal immigrants can integrate and provide a net benefit to the EU as well:
• https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/sites/futurium/files/jrc107441_wp_kancs_and_lecca_2017_4.pdf
  • Study on what would be the best policies for integrating migrants into the EU commissioned by the European Commission’s Joint Research Center
• Ismael Gálvez-Iniesta 21
  • Studies the impact of foreign-born workers on the labor market during a recession.
  • Using Spanish data, provides evidence that the impact of the Great Recession on employment was different for immigrant workers and native workers.
  • Secondly, documents that foreign outflows were very responsive to the crisis, as many immigrants left the country. it argues that this dynamic relationship of immigrants coming and going from the country benefits Spanish natives.
  • Three years after the Great Recession, the unemployment rate of Spanish natives
  • would have been 2.6 percentage points higher in the absence of the pre-crisis immigration boom.
  • Even though the effects of return-migration are unambiguously positive for natives, a key result of the quantitative analysis is that the job-creation effect of immigration is negative.
  • However, the counterfactual exercise predicts that return-migration (return of immigrants from Spain) and match-separation effects (Natives and immigrants working in different sectors) are positive and dominate the aforementioned negative job-creation effect, since the jobs destroyed belonged to immigrants. This implies overall welfare gains for native workers.
  • Infact, a decomposition analysis reveals that the return-migration channel is quantitatively the most relevant channel, since its short- and long-run impacts on the native unemployment rate are, respectively, 10 and 2 times as large as the sum of the impact of all the other channels.
  • Argues that policies which restrict immigration hurt this labor market flexibility which has been shown to help native workers.
• Adjei et al. 21: International Journal of Social Economics
  • Paper assesses how the immigration of refugees from the former Yugoslavia following the Balkan war in the early 1990s affected low-educated natives’ real wages, employment and income mobility using Swedish longitudinal data
  • This analysis coincided with a period of recession. Therefore, the paper uses difference-in-difference estimates to account for that with a control group.
  • Low-skilled native workers in immigration-rich regions, in contrast to immigration-poor regions, are more likely to experience better income development, be in employment and change workplace while also moving upwards in the wage hierarchy due to a labor supply shock caused by immigrants.
  • A short-lived decline in wages for natives with competing skills, followed by an increase in real wages, and an increase in employment in immigration-rich areas, when compared to areas with little immigration.
  • The movement effects are due to the impacts of complementarity and substitutability causing upgrades to a higher-wage job for low-skilled natives and movement to new jobs.
• Mette Foged & Giovanni Peri 13/Revised 15: National Bureau of Economic Research
  • Using longitudinal data on ALL workers in Denmark during the period 1991-2008, this study tracks the labor market outcomes of low skilled natives in response to an exogenous inflow of low skilled immigrants.
  • Innovates on previous identification strategies by considering immigrants distributed across municipalities by a refugee dispersal policy in place between 1986 and 1998.
  • Finds that the increase in the supply of refugee-country immigrants pushed less educated native workers (especially the young and low-tenured ones) to pursue less manual-intensive occupations.
  • As a result, immigration had positive effects on native unskilled wages, employment and occupational mobility.
• Ian Mulhern 18: Oxford Economics
  • Migration Advisory Committee report concluding immigrants have a net-benefit to neutral impact on the UK, with low-skilled immigrants only affecting low-skilled natives by a tiny margin, though their positive impact compared to high-skilled migrants seems more debatable:
• Migration Advisory Committee 18
  • Only counts European Economic Area (EEA) migrant effects
  • No evidence that European economic area (EEA) migration has increased unemployment on average, although there is a debate on whether unemployment is raised for low-skilled natives by a small margin
  • Overall, no evidence that EEA migration has reduced wages for UK-born workers on average. Some evidence that migration has reduced earnings growth by a small amount for the low-skilled natives and raised it for the higher-skilled ones, but again these findings are subject to uncertainty.
  • Possible adverse effects on low-skilled natives could be made up for by social programs, which become easier to fund through higher tax revenues from immigration and businesses employing immigrants
  • Since English would be a 2nd language for most low-skilled immigrants, studies done in the US by Peri would also count here, and low-skilled natives and low-skilled immigrants would not be substitutable.
• Eugenia Vella 21
  • Study on the demand effects of immigration to Germany from 2006-2019 using monthly administrative data for Germany.
  • Provides empirical evidence suggesting that net migration flows can have substantial demand effects. Migration stimulates job openings, wages, house prices, investment, consumption, net exports, and output. Unemployment falls for natives overall (job-creation effect), driving a decline in total unemployment, while rising for foreigners (job-competition effect).
  • Immigration as a whole in this period seems to have an average neutral effect on high-skilled natives, while decreasing the unemployment rates of low and medium-skilled natives, implying low substitutability between low and medium-skilled natives and foreigners.
  • Immigration from Syria and Africa, which have a large proportion of low-skilled immigrants, has a positive effect on low and medium-skilled natives and a neutral effect on high-skilled natives.
  • Interestingly, immigration from developed countries, which have higher proportions of high-skilled immigrants, has a negative employment effect only on high-skilled natives, while decreasing the unemployment rate of low-skilled foreigners.
  • Finds no evidence of low and medium-skilled natives being negatively affected by immigration in any circumstance.
  • Overall, the evidence implies that the policy debate should focus on redistributive policies to fully take advantage of the positive effects of immigration.
• Markus Ghersitz & Martin Ungerer 17: IZA Institute of Economics
  • Part of a MASSIVE study on the effects of immigration on crime, native and former immigrant wage and employment levels, and attitudes to immigration. Click here for the crime aspects and here for the attitude aspects
  • Within states, migrants were allocated to counties based on reasons unrelated to local labor market conditions.
  • No evidence that neither incomes nor the skill compositions of natives differ substantially between high and low migration counties.
  • More importantly, counties that experience small refugee inflows and those with large inflows appear to follow identical time trends in terms of unemployment, crime and voting patterns. This allows to obtain credibly causal effects on less stringent identification assumptions. This indicates, also, little evidence of an impact on those from immigration.
  • Finds little evidence for displacement of native workers by refugees. However, findings suggest difficulties in integrating refugees into the German labor markets, with increasing difficulties with increasing numbers of them. In other words, finds that former refugees could suffer from newer refugees, suggesting low substitutability between natives and refugees in the labor market. This issue has, however, been suggested untrue by other figures.
• Dominique M. Gross 99
  • This paper investigates the effects of the flows of immigrant workers on the French labor market between the mid-1970s and mid-1990s.
  • Using a system of equations for unemployment, labor-force participation, the real wage, and the immigration rate, it is shown that, in the long run, legal and amnestied immigrant workers, and their families, lower the unemployment rate permanently. This is due to increased consumption and aggregate demand.
  • In the short run, the arrival of immigrants can raise aggregate wages through the complementarity of immigrants and natives and, thus, increase unemployment slightly. However, this effect is short-lived and similar to an increase in domestic labour force participation.
  • Finds little evidence for displacement effects due to migration, concluding that immigrant flows are not responsible for France’s high unemployment rates.
• F. D’Amuri & G. Peri 12
  • Paper analyses the impact of immigrants on the type and quantity of natives’ jobs using data on fifteen Western European countries during the 1996-2010 period.
  • Finds that immigrants, by taking up manual-routine type of occupations, pushed natives towards more complex (abstract and communication) jobs.
  • This job upgrade was associated with a 0.7% increase in native wages for a doubling of the immigrants’ share.
  • These results are robust to the use of an IV strategy based on the past settlement of immigrants across European countries. The job upgrade slowed, but did not come to a halt, during the Great Recession of 2008-2009.
  • Additionally, the labour market flows behind it show that the complexity of jobs offered to new native hires was greater than that of lost jobs.
  • This mechanism mainly benefits low-skilled immigrants.
• Andri Chassamboulli & Theodore Palivos 13: Bank of Greece
  • Analyzes the impact of the immigration influx that took place during the years 2000–2007 in Greece on labor market outcomes. We employ a search and matching framework that allows for skill groups and differential unemployment income (search cost for firms to hire) between immigrants and natives.
  • Within such a framework, the study finds that skilled native workers, who complement immigrants (who are largely unskilled) in production, gain in terms of both wages and employment. The effects on unskilled native workers, who compete with immigrants, on the other hand, are ambiguous and depend first on the presence of a statutory minimum wage and second on the way that this minimum wage is determined. If there is a minimum wage, unskilled natives gain in terms of wages, but lose in terms of the unemployment rate. If there is bargaining with no minimum wage, they gain in terms of unemployment, but lose when it comes to wages.
• Haus-Reve et al. 21: Economic Geography
  • This article considers how assimilation might shape diversity’s economic benefits in Norway. Intuition suggests two conflicting dynamics. Assimilation could lower barriers immigrants and natives face in interacting with one another, and thus enhance benefits. Equally, however, assimilation could reduce heuristic differences between immigrants and native-born workers, dampening spillovers from diversity.
  • Using linked employer–employee data from Norway to test these ideas, the authors construct diversity indices at the regional and workplace scale to capture different aspects of assimilation, and observe how these are related to worker productivity, proxied using wages.
  • Finds that assimilation dampens externalities from immigrant diversity. Diversity among second-generation or childhood migrants offers smaller benefits than diversity in teenage or adult arrivals. Immigrants’ cultural proximity to Norway, and their experience of tertiary education in Norway, each also reduce the social return to diversity, while their cultural dissimilarity increases the return.
  • While assimilation processes may benefit society in various ways, these findings are consistent with the idea that, by diminishing the heuristic gaps between migrants and native-born workers, integration reduces the productivity externalities derived from immigrant diversity.
  • This indicates that, to maintain the largest benefits, a continuous flow of supply of labor is ideal.
• Mitaritonna et al. 16: National Bureau of Economic Research
  • Paper analyzing the impact of an increase in the local supply of immigrants on firms’ outcomes, allowing for heterogeneous effects across firms according to their initial productivity.
  • Using micro-level data on French manufacturing firms spanning the period 1995-2005, a supply-driven increase in the share of foreign-born workers in a French department (a small geographic area) increased the total factor productivity of firms in that department.
  • Immigrants were prevalently highly educated and this effect is consistent with a positive complementarity and spillover effects from their skills.
  • This effect was significantly stronger for firms with low initial productivity and small size. This means that immigration was responsible for the growth of new drivers of the economy.
  • The positive productivity effect of immigrants was also associated with faster growth of capital, larger exports and higher wages for natives. Highly skilled natives were pushed towards firms that did not hire too many immigrants spreading positive productivity effects to those firms too. Because of stronger effects on smaller and initially less productive firms, the aggregate effects of immigrants at the department level on average productivity and employment was small.
• Javier Ortega & Grégory Verdugo 11: European Economics: Labor & Social Conditions eJournal
  • Paper evaluates the impact of immigration on the labor market outcomes of natives in France over the period 1962-1999.
  • Combining large (up to 25%) extracts from six censuses and data from Labor Force Surveys, it exploits the variation in the immigrant share across education/experience cells and over time to identify the impact of immigration.
  • Finds that a 10% increase in immigration increases native wages by 3%.
  • However, as the number of immigrants and the number of natives are positively and strongly correlated across cells, the immigrant share may not be a good measure of the immigration shock.
  • When the log of natives and the log of immigrants are used as regressors instead, the impact of immigration on natives’ wages is still positive but much smaller, and natives’ wages are negatively related to the number of natives.
  • To understand this asymmetry and the positive impact of immigration on wages, it explores the link between immigration and the occupational distribution of natives within education/experience cells. Results suggest that immigration leads to the reallocation of natives to better-paid occupations within education/experience cells.
• Ortega & Verdugo 14 (non-paywall)
  • Similar research to the below US paper**, except conducted on the French labor market.
  • Findings are near-identical; immigration leads to across-the-board wage increases for all except a small minority of low-education native workers.
  • Reaffirms conclusion that there is low substitutability between native workers and immigrant workers.

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Taxes and Welfare

Taxes and Welfare

• M. Dolores Collado & Guadalupe Valera 04: International Tax and Public Finance
  • Paper tries to quantify the impact of immigration on the Spanish Welfare State using the methodology of Generational Accounting.
  • The Spanish population will experience significant aging in coming years. This demographic change will impose a heavy burden on the national budget. In particular, expenditure on pensions and health are expected to rise significantly. The inflow of immigrants could help to alleviate the fiscal burden that future generations will have to bear.
  • Results suggest that the impact of immigration on the public balance will be positive and significant
• Majlinda et al. 20: University of Luxembourg
  • Using data from European Survey on Living Conditions (EU-SILC), estimates the net fiscal position of immigrants in Europe between 2007-2015.
  • The net fiscal position is the difference between social services obtained and personal taxes paid leading to be either a fiscal contributor or a fiscal dependent.
  • On average, the fiscal impact of both European and non-European migrants is not different from that of native citizens.
  • Additionally, EU immigrants in the bottom 5% of the income distribution are not more fiscally dependent than natives in any country, while non-EU immigrants in the bottom 5% are substantially larger net contributors than natives in the same bottom 5%. The same is true for non-EU immigrants in the top 5% of income, as they contribute considerably more than natives.
  • Non-EU migrants in Belgium and the Netherlands belonging to the upper tail of the income distribution are much more contributors as compared with the corresponding native citizens of the same income.
  • At last, finds a very contrasting relationship between the fiscal perception of European citizens regarding immigrants and the calculated fiscal impact of immigrants: countries, where immigrants are perceived negatively, are instead countries where migrants are net fiscal contributors and vice-versa
  • A limitation of the study is that it calculates contributions as personal taxes paid by the individual, instead of taxes caused by the individual. The migrant also has a job, and generates taxes through their job, and through productivity growth (seen as increase in GDP per capita) and job creation through complementarity. These are contributions which would not be there if the immigrants had not migrated to the country.
• Christian Dustmann and Tommaso Frattini 14: University College London
  • Findings show that immigrants to the UK who arrived since 2000 have made consistently positive fiscal contributions regardless of their area of origin.
  • Between 2001 and 2011, recent immigrants contributed 25$ billion to the fiscal system.
  • Between 2001 and 2011 recent immigrants from the A10 countries contributed to the fiscal system about 12% more than they took out, with a net fiscal contribution of about £5 billion.
  • At the same time, the net fiscal contributions of recent European immigrants from the rest of the EU totalled £15bn, with fiscal payments about 64% higher than transfers received.
  • Immigrants from outside the EU countries made a net fiscal contribution of about £5.2 billion, thus paying into the system about 3% more than they took out.
  • In contrast, over the same period, natives made an overall negative fiscal contribution of £616.5 billion. The net fiscal balance of overall immigration to the UK between 2001 and 2011 amounts therefore to a positive net contribution of about £25 billion, a period over which the UK has run an overall budget deficit.
  • Recent immigrants are 43% (17 percentage points) less likely to receive state benefits or tax credits. These differences are partly attributable to immigrants’ more favourable age-gender composition. However, even when compared with natives of the same age, gender composition, and education, recent immigrants are still 39% less likely than natives to receive benefits.
  • Recent immigrants, by sharing the cost of public expenditures insensitive to population size (such as defence) which account for 16% of total public expenditure, reduced the financial burden of these fixed public obligations for natives by about £8.5bn over the period 2001-2011.
  • Research points at the strong educational background of immigrants. For instance, while by 2011, the percentage of natives with a degree was 24%, that of EEA and non-EEA immigrants was 35% and 41%, respectively. Similarly, about one in two native born individuals fall into the “low education” category (defined as those who left full- time education before 17), while only 21% of EEA immigrants and 23% of non-EEA immigrants do so.
• d’Albis et al. 18: Science Advances
  • Synopsis of the study: Migrants and refugees are good for economies
  • The present study uses annual statistical data from 15 Western European countries from 1985 to 2015. The selected countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Portugal, and the UK.
  • Attempts to estimate the effects of a migrant shock caused by immigrants and asylum seekers respectively in Europe.
  • Finds no evidence of a deterioration of the economic or fiscal situation upon the arrival of immigrants or asylum seekers, because the increase in public spending is compensated by an increase in tax revenues. On the contrary, finds that over time, asylum seekers have a positive effect on the fiscal balance, lowered unemployment and GDP per capita.
  • The effect of a shock on the net flow of migrants is positive from the year of that shock and remains significant for at least 2 years. An inflow of asylum seekers takes longer to significantly affect the economy; in particular, significant positive effects on GDP are observed from 3 to 7 years after this shock.
  • The extents of the observed effects also differ: The effects of a shock on the net flow of migrants are strong. GDP per capita increases significantly for 4 years running, with an increase of +0.32% 2 years after the shock; the unemployment rate falls by roughly 0.14 percentage points 2 years after the shock; and fiscal balance improves by 0.11 percentage points at its peak, which occurs 1 year after the shock.
  • Attributes the difference in positive effects to the facts that many asylum seekers don’t remain in their host countries for long, and that they find it hard to access the labor market due to lack of legal status. Thus, making it easier for asylum seekers to access the labor market by legalizing asylum seekers and teaching them skills seems apt.
  • Can additionally be argued that the reason many asylum seekers don’t remain in their host countries is that they can’t receive legal status, hence a streamlining of the asylum process would increase positive effects.
• Migration Advisory Committee 18
  • Only counts European economic area (EEA) migrants
  • High-skilled immigrants increase innovation, increasing productivity per capita and the fiscal balance.
  • EEA migrants, especially those from EU13+, pay more in taxes than they receive in welfare benefits and consume in public services. Net fiscal benefit is strongly related to earnings and to age.
  • EEA migrants make a larger contribution both in terms of money and work to the NHS than they receive in health services. No evidence that migration has reduced the quality of healthcare.
  • EEA migrants are a small but increasing share of the social care workforce. Very few EEA migrants receive social care. Growing demand for social care but wages and conditions make it hard to recruit and retain UK residents. May also struggle to recruit migrants with other options. Sector needs a coherent approach to financing.
  • Migrants or the children of migrants make up an increasing proportion of the school-age population. EEA migrants are a smaller proportion of workers than students in primary and secondary education but a higher proportion in higher education. Children with English as an additional language academically out-perform children with English as a first language. These two benefits count for low-skilled immigrants too, as their children are much more productive than native citizens. No evidence that migration has reduced the educational attainment of other children or the choice of schools.
  • EEA migrants, especially those from EU13+, pay more in taxes than they receive in welfare benefits and consume in public services. Net fiscal benefit is strongly related to earnings and to age.
• Jill Rutter and Maria Latorre 09:
  • Equality and human rights commission research report indicating that migrants don’t get preferential treatment when it comes to social housing, noting that more investment is needed for it instead:
  • Small amount of evidence which suggests unintentional discrimination against ethnic minority communities who may also have less understanding than white groups of their housing rights and housing allocation:
    • “Some local authority social housing allocation policies gave priority to certain social characteristics, for example, to a local connection. This had the potential to discriminate against migrants and longer settled ethnic minority communities, who may have few relatives in the UK or a lesser period of settlement.”
  • More social housing and affordable private housing is needed, and the potential for housing shortages to remain a focus for community tensions should be recognised.
• Adam Steventon & Martin Bardsley 11
  • Study showing a specific area in which immigrants use less on social spending than natives
  • Routine anonymized data were used to identify people who appear as registering with a general practitioner (GP) for the first time in England yet are aged 15 or over. We assumed that most long-term residents will have registered before the age of 15, and therefore the majority of those registering for the first time later in life will be international immigrants. The study compared hospital admissions among first registrants to the general population of England and to within-England migrants, selected using propensity scoring.
  • The first registrants aged 15 or over had around half the rate of hospital admission as that of the general population of England. They were also less likely to have a hospital admission than a matched group of within-England migrants. The lower admission rates persisted over several years and were consistent in three consecutive cohorts of first registrants (each consisting of over half a million people).

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Economic Growth

Economic Growth

• Mongelli I., Ciscar J.-C. 18: Joint Research Center
  • Without international migration:
    • The 2060 EU production or output (real GDP) would be 23% lower (Italy -33%, Spain -28%, UK -19%, Germany -35%, France -18%), compared to the projection with migration.
    • In 2060 there could be an estimated output loss of almost 7 trillion US$, compared to the scenario with migration (Figure B).
    • The cumulative output loss for the entire projection period would be around 47 trillion US$ (discounted at a 3% rate).
    • That would mean losing almost twenty years of economic growth: the 2043 EU output which could be reached with migration would be only attained without migration in 2060.
    • The annual EU growth rate would fall over the long term (for the 2013-2060 period) from 1.5% to less than 1.0%.
    • In 2060 the EU output per capita with migration flows would be around 57,000 US$, but it would fall to around 51,000 US$ without migration (around 10%). Most of the EU population would be worse off.
  • Benefits brought about by positive effect on savings rate and productivity levels as it reduces the EU population ageing.
• d’Artis Kancs Patrizio Lecca 17: Joint Research Centre
  • Study on what would be the best policies for integrating migrants into the EU commissioned by the European Commission’s Joint Research Center:
  • Limited to socioeconomic effects
  • Simulates integration measures like providing welfare benefits, language and professional training to varying degrees;
  • Concludes that the initial investment is repaid after 9 years (at full integration policy) to 19 years (at non-integration), and that depending on the integration policy and financing method, long-run GDP growth would be 0.2-1.4% above the baseline
  • Integrated refugees address Europe’s alarming demographic trends, fill vacancies with specific skill requirements, improve the ratio of economically active to those who are inactive, a ratio that is falling in many Member States, and boost jobs and growth in the EU.
  • According to simulation results for the policy “status quo integration scenario”, the long-run cost of non-integration is likely to be considerably higher than the short-run investment costs of the refugee integration, as shown in the full integration scenario.
• Gerrit Manthei 21: Intereconomics
  • Study examines the long-term per capita growth effects of refugee immigration with the help of an augmented Cobb–Douglas production model and a two-step quantitative analysis that explored a range of economic scenarios.
  • Indicates that refugee immigration can lead to long-term per capita growth. Key to this development is the age structure of refugees and, to a slightly lesser degree, their qualification structure.
  • The length of time needed by refugees to integrate mainly determines the time required to reach the break-even point. This means that making it easier and faster to seek asylum status improves the positive effects.
  • Interestingly, the results show that capital stock has the greatest impact on per capita growth. Without a migration-related increase in the available capital stock in the host country, positive per capita growth is unlikely, even under optimistic assumptions. In fact, the per capita economic output could drop significantly. Usually, an increase in the supply of labor (like with migration) encourages companies to invest in a country to take advantage of that supply, as the labor to capital ratio tends to stay the same over the long term with immigration.
  • Results apply to other countries, as no Germany-specific assumptions were made
• Migration Advisory Committee 18
  • Only counts European Economic Area (EEA) migrant effects
  • Evidence that immigration has, on average, a positive impact on productivity. Some evidence that this impact is larger for high-skilled migrants than lower-skilled migrants.
  • No evidence that migration has reduced the training opportunities of the UK-born, meaning the quality of their education and therefore their wages don’t suffer as a result.
  • Evidence that migration, especially lower-skilled, has reduced the prices of personal services. Evidence that migration has raised house prices, more in areas where house building is more restricted. The solution is then to make house building easier.